In his decision, Judge Child ruled that the Area Manager erred in his final decision in failing to “mention the facts regarding [Lamb’s] sale of his former base property to the United States pursuant to the Navy contract and his subsequent acquisition, improvement and use of the Seven Devils Ranch in possible violation of said contract” (Decision at 7).
After reciting the facts surrounding Lamb’s sale of his base property and his purchase of the Seven Devils Ranch, Judge Child stated:
The determination of whether the Seven Devils Ranch constitutes a “base operation” in violation of the Navy contract is a material consideration relevant to the criterion of need. By entering into the Navy contract, [Lamb] agreed to sell his former base property and relinquish his former grazing preferences, thus creating his need to acquire new grazing preferences if he opted to stay in the livestock business. Patently, [Lamb] has need of the grazing preferences in question only if he is to conduct his livestock business on the Boyer Ranch allotment. [Lamb] can conduct a livestock business within the Navy’s Supersonic Operating Area only in conformance with the Navy contract which prohibits him from utilizing a “base operation” within the Supersonic Operating Area. If [Lamb] has established a “base operation” within the Supersonic Operating Area, then [Lamb] may have made himself ineligible to operate on the Boyer Ranch allotment and should be required to go elsewhere to conduct his livestock business. (Decision at 8-9).
In his findings of fact, Judge Child stated that Lamb had “made the Seven Devils Ranch a base operation to the conducting of his livestock business on the Boyer Ranch allotment” (Decision at 12).
On appeal, Lamb vigorously argues that any consideration of the Navy contract by Judge Child was totally improper. Lamb cites three reasons in support of that argument:
(1) he did not violate that contract;
(2) even if he were in violation, such a violation would be totally immaterial to any issue before BLM in deciding whether to grant a grazing permit to Lamb under the Taylor Grazing Act; and (3) it violates the terms of the stipulation, which limited determination to the criteria (SOR at 20-24).
[3] Judge Child erred in ruling that the Area Manager should have considered the effect of the terms of the Navy contract in evaluating the needs of the applicants’ livestock operations. The parties to that contract were the United States, acting through the Department of the Navy, and Lamb. BLM has no authority to adjudicate a claim raised by a stranger 131 IBLA